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Ignorance of the Lav\/ as a
Defence to Rape: The Destruction
of a Maxim
Kenneth J. Arenson*
Abstract In DPP v Morgan, the House of Lords correctly concluded that an
accused wbo entertained a genuine belief tbat a woman was consenting to
carnal knowledge of her person could not be convicted of tbe common
law crime of rape as sucb a belief and tbe requisite mens rea to convict were
mutually exclusive of one another. Though England and Wales have
resiled from this position by virtue of the Sexual Offences Act 2003,
s. l(b), which allows for conviction upon proof that tbe accused did not
reasonably believe tbat the complainant was consenting, the Morgan
principle bas retained its vitality at common law as well as under the
various statutory crimes of rape that exist tbrougbout Australia, most
notably the provisions of s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Despite a long
line of Victorian Court of Appeal decisions wbich have reaffirmed tbe
Morgan principle, tbe court has construed s. 37AA(b)(ii) of tbe Act as
leaving open the possibility of an acquittal despite the fact tbat the accused
acted witb an awareness that one or more factors that are statutorily
deemed as negating consent under s. 36(a)-(g) of the Act were operating
at the time of his or ber sexual penetration; specifically, the court held that
tbe foregoing factors do not necessarily preclude a jury from finding that
tbe accused acted in the genuine belief that the complainant was consent-
ing. This article endeavours to explain bow tbe accused could be aware of
sucb circumstances at the time of penetration, yet still entertain sucb a
belief. The article ultimately concludes that such an anomaly can only be
explained through a combination of the poor drafting of s. 37AA(b)(ii)
and tbe court's apparent refusal to follow tbe longstanding precept that
ignorance of tbe law is never a defence to a crime, ostensibly prompted by
its adherence to the cardinal precept that legislation is not to be construed
as superfiuous.
Keywords Rape; Defence of consent; Honest and reasonable belief
in consent; Ignorance of the law
In DPP V Morgan the House of Lords enunciated the principle that an
accused cannot be convicted of the common law offence of rape if the
criminal act of carnal knowledge was accompanied by an honest, though
not necessarily reasonable belief that the complainant was consenting.
This belief, according to the House of Lords, necessitates an acquittal
because it cannot be reconciled with the mens rea for rape that requires
proof that the accused intended to have carnal knowledge of the com-
plainant without her consent. In Morgan, this mens rea was construed to
mean that at the time of the criminal act, the accused was aware that the
complainant was not or might not be consenting. Although the Morgan
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principle is still considered a sound principle under the common law as
well as the statutory version of rape that now exists in Victoria, a recent
line of decisions of the Victorian Court of Appeal, whilst appearing to
reaffirm the Morgan precept, has emasculated its impact by effectively
holding that ignorance of the law is tantamount to an honestly held
belief that the complainant was consenting. This article will not only
examine these recent decisions, but address the question of why the
Court of Appeal would embrace a view that is not only untenable, but
flouts the time-honoured maxim that 'ignorance of the law is not a
defence'.'
Introduction
There is surely no paucity of notorious maxims in the law, but there is
arguably none more hackneyed than ignorance of the law is no excuse.^
In a series of recent decisions dealing with ss 37AAA and 37AA of the
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), the Victorian Court of Appeal has tacitly over-
ruled this maxim and adopted the precept that ignorance of the law is
tantamount to a genuine belief that the complainant was consenting to
the proscribed sexual penetration or conduct, thereby absolving the
accused of liability for various sexual assault offences in which the
complainant's lack of consent is a constituent element. The discussion to
follow will first examine the history and rationale for the general
common law principle that where an accused's bona fide belief that
something is true cannot co-exist with one or more of the mens reas
required by an offence, the fact-finder must be instructed to acquit if it
finds that the putative belief was actually held by the accused at the time
of his or her criminal act or omission.' Secondly, the discussion will
carefully examine the language of the foregoing sections in order to
determine whether they are consonant with or inimical to this precept.
Thirdly, and assuming the latter, attention will then focus on the Court
of Appeal's rather alarming decision to eschew the above maxim as a
means of construing ss 37AAA and 37AA as though they were con-
sistent with the precept. Finally, the discussion will turn to the question
of what factor or factors may account for this blatant departure from
what is perhaps the most widely known maxim known to the law.
The DPP V Morgan principle
In the case of DPP v Morgan,* the accused and three cohorts were
convicted of raping his wife. Prior to the incident, the accused had
encouraged the others to have sex with his wife and informed them that
1 Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 KB 544 at 546.
2 Churchill v Walton [1967 AC 224 at 236-7; Giorgianni v R (1985) 156 CLR 473 at
506; Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661 at 667, 676.
3 R V Toison (1889) 23 QBD 168 'an honest and reasonable beUef in the existence of
circumstances which, if true, would make the act for which a prisoner is indicted
an innocent act has always been held to be a good defence'; R v hrown (1975) 10
SASR 139 at 151-2; DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 ('Morgan').
4 [1976] AC 182. It should be noted that England and Wales have now resiled from
the Morgan principle by virtue of s. 1 of the Sexual Offences Art 2003. In order to
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because she was somewhat 'kinky', they should not be surprised if she
struggled as that was the only way she could become sexually aroused.'
All four men were convicted. For present purposes, the primary issue
raised on appeal to the House of Lords was whether the trial judge had
misdirected the jury in stating that an honest and reasonable belief by the
accused that the complainant was consenting would negate the requisite
intention to have carnal knowledge* of the complainant without her
consent,'' thereby necessitating an acquittal.* In a rather discursive
discussion of what must be proven in order to satisfy the jury that the
accused had this intention, the House of Lords ultimately concluded that
the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
intended to have carnal knowledge of the complainant without her
consent while aware that she was not or might not be consenting to the
same.' When a common law or statutory offence requires proof that the
accused acted with a particular state of mind such as this, in legal
parlance that mental state is commonly referred to as a mens rea element
of the crime'" that, like all other elements of the offence, must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt."
In writing for the majority. Lord Hailsham opined that a bona fide
belief that a woman is consenting to carnal knowledge cannot be
reconciled with the mens rea for rape which requires proof that the
accused intended to have carnal knowledge of the complainant without
her consent while being aware that she was not consenting or might not
be consenting.'^ Lord Hailsham further held that this is so irrespective of
whether the belief was such that it would have been held by a reason-
able person in like circumstances." His Lordship also emphasised, how-
ever, that this is not to say that the reasonableness of the alleged belief
is devoid of relevance; rather, the reasonableness of the putative belief is
a factor that may be considered by the jury in determining whether it
was in fact held by the accused. '*
prove rape under s. 1, the prosecution must prove, as a constituent element, that
the accused did not reasonably believe the complainant was consenting.
5 Ibid, at 206.
6 At common law, carnal knowledge denotes any amount of penile penetration of the
vaginal cavity, however slight, and regardless of whether there is emission of
seminal fluid: Holland v The Queen (1993) 67 AUR 946.
7 At common law, consent denotes free and conscious permission: R v Wilkes and
Briant [1965] VR 475 at 480. Thus, if one accedes to sexual intercourse out of force
or fear of force or otber barm of any type, there is no consent.
8 Morgan [1976] AC 182 at 183.
9 Ibid, at 208-9.
10 Myerson v Collard (1918) 25 CLR 154 at 167; R v Tumbull (1943) 44 NSWLR 180;
Iannella v French (1986) 119 CLR 84.
U K . Arenson and M. Bagaric, Rules of Evidence in Australia: Text and Cases, 2nd edn
(LexisNexis: 2007) 14-16, 21, 26.
12 Morgan [1976] AC 182, 208-09. This intention could only be proved by satisfying
the jury beyond reasonable doubt tbat the accused had carnal knowledge of a
woman while aware that she was not or might not be consenting: at 215.
13 Ibid, at 210.
14 Ibid, at 214. The Morgan principle was adopted by the Victorian Court of Appeal in
R V Saragozza [1984] VR 187 and reaffirmed by the court in a more recent series of
decisions: R v Zilm [2006] VSCA 72 (5 April 2006) ('Zilm'); Worsnop v The Queen
[2010] VSCA 188 (28 July 2010) CWorsnop'); Getachewv The Queen [2011] VSCA
164 (2 June 2011) CGetachew'); Roberts v The Queen [2011] VSCA 162 (2 June 2011)
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In logic and principle. Lord Hailsham's reasoning is all but impervious
to criticism. If a person has carnal knowledge of a woman or assists or
encourages others to do so while holding a belief that she is consenting,
it is impossible to reconcile that belief with the mens rea for rape which
requires that the accused must intend to have carnal knowledge of a
woman without her consent while aware that she is not or might not be
consenting. It is noteworthy that at common law, acts of forcible sodomy
were not classified as rape because they involved penetration of orifices
other than the vaginal cavity via penile penetration." Instead, these acts
were criminalised under the statutory crime of buggery that, inexplic-
ably, was considered as a less serious crime than rape.'* As acts of
forcible sodomy are now considered no less intrusive, abhorrent and
repugnant than the crime of rape according to its common law defini-
tion, statutes have now been enacted in all Australian jurisdictions that
broaden the scope of rape to include all forms of non-consensual sexual
penetration."
The Morgan principle and ss 37AAA and 37AA of the
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)
Sections llAJiJ^ and 37AA of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) provide:
37AAA. Jury directions on consent
For the purposes of section 37, tbe matters relating to consent on which tbe
judge must direct tbe jury are—
(a) the meaning of consent set out in section 36;
(b) that tbe law deems a circumstance specified in section 36 to be a
circumstance in which the complainant did not consent;
(c) tbat if tbe jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt tbat a circum-
stance specified in section 36 exists in relation to tbe complainant,
the jury must find tbat tbe complainant was not consenting;
('Roberts'); Nealv The Queen [2011] VSCA 172 (15 June 2011) {'Neal'); and Wilson v
The Queen [2011] VSCA 328 (27 Oaober 2011) {'Wilson'). The Morgan principle was
recently reaffirmed by the High Court's decision in R v Getachew [2012] HCA 10 (28
March 2012) at [21]-[25] {'Getachew 2'). These Victorian Court of Appeal decisions,
unlike Morgan, dealt with the statutory crime of rape under s. 38 of the Crimes Act
1958 (Vic) which supplanted the common law crime of rape that existed in Victoria
prior to 1981. While the basic principle of Morgan was reaffirmed in each of these
decisions, it should be noted that unUke the general common law definition of
consent or the lack thereof set out above n. 7, s. 36 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)
appears to provide a finite list of circumstances in which consent is deemed to be
lacking: Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 November 1991,
1998 (Jim Kennan, Attorney-General); Viaoria, Law Reform Commission, Rape:
Reform of Law and Procedure, Report No. 43 (1991) 6 [12].
15 The common law definition of rape required 'carnal knowledge of a woman':
K. J. Arenson, M. Bagaric and P. Gillies, Australian Criminal Law in the Common Law
Jurisdictions: Cases and Materials, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press: 2011) 299.
16 For example, the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (UK), s. 1(1) specified a maximum
penalty of Ufe imprisonment for rape whue forced buggery (s. 12(1)) attracted as
little as 10 years as a maximum penalty where the victim was an adult male.
17 See, e.g.. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s. 61H(1); Criminal Code (NT), s. 1; Criminal
Code (Qld), s. 1; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s. 5(3); Tasmania
Criminal Code (Tas), s. 1; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s. 35. In New South Wales, what is
referred to as 'rape' in other jurisdictions is encompassed in s. 611 which is termed
'sexual assault'.
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(d) that the fact that a person did not say or do anything to indicate free
agreement to a sexual act at the time at which tbe act took place is
enough to show that the act took place without that person's free
agreement;
(e) that the jury is not to regard a person as having freely agreed to a
sexual act just because
(i) she or he did not protest or physically resist; or
(ii) she or he did not sustain physical injury; or
(iii) on that or an earlier occasion, she or he freely agreed to engage
in another sexual act (whether or not of the same type) with
that person, or a sexual act with another person.
37AA. Jury directions on the accused's awareness
For tbe purposes of section 37, if evidence is led or an assertion is made that
the accused believed that the complainant was consenting to the sexual act,
the judge must direa the jury that in considering whether the prosecution
has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was aware that tbe
complainant was not consenting or might not have been consenting, the
jury must consider—
(a) any evidence of that belief; and
(b) whether that belief was reasonable in all the relevant circumstances
having regard to—
(i) in the case of a proceeding in which the jury finds that a circumstance
specified in setíion 36 exists in relation to the complainant, whether the
accused was aware that that circumstance existed in relation to the
complainant; and
(ii) whether the accused took any steps to ascertain whether tbe
complainant was consenting or might not be consenting, and if
so, the nature of those steps; and
(iii) any other relevant matters, (emphasis added)
Read together, ss 37AAA and 37AA appear to codify the basic principle
enunciated in Morgan,^^ the only difference being that s. 37AA sets out
specific factors that a jury must be directed to consider in its determina-
tion of whether to accept evidence that the accused honestly believed
that the complainant was consenting to the sexual act in question.
Notably, s. 37AA does not enumerate an exhaustive list of factors. This
is evidenced by s. 37AA(b)(iii) which states that in addition to the
specific factors enumerated in s. 37AA, the jury must be directed to
'consider . . . any other relevant factors'. It is fair to conclude, therefore,
that ss 37AAA and 37AA are entirely consonant with the Morgan
precept.
In Victoria and elsewhere, rape and various other sexual offences
require the prosecution to prove, as a constituent element, that the
complainant did not consent to the sexual conduct in question. Section
36 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), which expressly states that it is
applicable only with regard to offences contained in Subdivisions (8A) to
(8D) of the Act, enunciates a myriad of circumstances in which consent
to the alleged sexual conduct will be lacking. That said, there are two
plausible constructions of s. 36: one that regards the circumstances
18 [1976] AC 182.
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enumerated in subss (a)-(g) of that section as the only factors that will
negate consent, and another that regards subss (a)-(g) as merely an
exhaustive list of circumstances in which lack of consent is deemed^^ to
exist and operates to complement and augment the broader notion of
lack of consent as expressed by the use of the term 'free agreement' in
s. 36 which prefaces the deeming situations set out in subss (a)-(g).
Section 36 provides:
36. Meaning of consent
For tbe purposes of Subdivisions (8A) to (8D) consent means free agree-
ment. Circumstances in wbich a person does not freely agree to an act
include the following—
(a) the person submits because of force or the fear of force to tbat person
or someone else;
(b) the person submits because of tbe fear of harm of any type to tbat
person or someone else;
(c) tbe person submits because sbe or be is unlawfully detained;
(d) the person is asleep, unconscious, or so affected by alcohol or
another drug as to be incapable of freely agreeing;
(e) the person is incapable of understanding tbe sexual nature of the
act;
(f) tbe person is mistaken about tbe sexual nature of tbe act or the
identity of tbe person;
(g) the person mistakenly believes tbat tbe act is for medical or hygienic
purposes.
It is noteworthy that s. 36 is silent on the question of whether Parlia-
ment intended subss (a)-(g) to constitute a finite rather than a mere
suggested list of factors that will be deemed as negating consent. Though
the question has yet to be authoritatively decided by either the Victorian
Court of Appeal or the High Court of Australia, the writer believes the
better view to be that subss (a)-(g) of s. 36 represent an exhaustive set
of circumstances which, if proven, will negate the complainant's con-
sent. In the writer's opinion, there are at least three factors that lend
credence to this view. The first is that the very breadth of s. 36(a)-(g)
suggests that the Victorian Parliament considered practically every con-
ceivable circumstance is which 'free agreement' should be deemed as
having been negated. Secondly, had Parliament intended otherwise, it
could, for example, have prefaced subss (a)-(g) with the words, 'in-
clude, but are not limited to the following' or other words to that effect.
Since it did not, and given the breadth of the circumstances set forth in
subss (a)-(g), both logic and common sense militate in favour of a finite
construction of s. 36. Finally, while the Second Reading Speech of the
Crimes (Rape) Bill 1991 does not directly address this issue, it does imply
that the list was intended to be exhaustive because the intention of the
legislation was said to be that of expressly stating and defining the
19 Wilson [2011] VSCA 328 (27 October 2011) at [132]; Roberts [2011] VSCA 162
(2 June 2011) at [26].
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elements of rape to remove uncertainty.^" This stated purpose is ob-
viously best served by a closed definition of the factors negating consent.
Though there are more than ample statements made by the Victorian
Law Reform Commission and even some academic commentary^' that
support the contrary point of view, none of these statements carries the
force of law, nor are they refiected in the statute itself or its legislative
history.
On another view, however, s. 36 begins by declaring that 'consent
means free agreement' and only then goes on to add a finite list of
circumstances in which consent will be deemed as lacking. Although the
term 'free agreement' is not specifically defined in s. 36 nor in its
Explanatory Memorandum or Second Reading Speech, the fact that
Victoria is a common law jurisdiction^^ necessitates that the common
law remains in effect in the absence of a clear legislative intention to the
contrary, either expressly or by necessary implication.^' Thus, in the
event of a statutory ambiguity such as the undefined use of the term
'free agreement' in s. 36, the Victorian courts are duty bound to give the
term whatever meaning, if any, it has at common law or at least resort
to common law principles in an attempt to ascertain its meaning.^'* In R
V Wilkes and Bryant,^^ the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria did
not take issue with the trial judge's direction that insofar as the crime of
rape is defined at common law, a woman's lack of consent to carnal
knowledge denotes a lack of 'free and conscious permission' to the
same.^* This may be viewed as a form of tacit approval of the trial judge's
direction. Thus, one must assume that the term 'free agreement' or the
lack thereof under s. 36 must be accorded the same meaning as ex-
pressed by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Wilkes and
Bryant. Though the situations in which consent will be deemed as
lacking under s. 36(a)-(g) are quite expansive, it requires little imagina-
tion to envisage that there are circumstances outside the parameters
s. 36(a)-(g) in which consent in the form of free and conscious permis-
sion will be lacking.
For example, take the stereotypical rape scenario in which the com-
plainant is kidnapped and forcibly dragged into a dark alley where
despite screaming, kicking and continually protesting against the im-
pending act of sexual penetration, the rapist is still able to consummate
the sexual act through the use of brute force. Here, it is apparent that the
rapist acted without the victim's free and conscious permission, yet it
20 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 November 1991, 1998
(Jim Kennan, Attorney-General); Victoria, Law Reform Commission, Rape: Reform of
Law and Procedure, Report No. 43 (1991) 6 [12].
21 For an academic view to the contrary, see P. Gillies, Criminal Law, 4th edn (LBC
Information Services: 1997) 591.
22 Arenson, Bagaric and Gillies, above n. 15 at 3.
23 Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277 at 304; Davern v Messet (1984) 155 CLR 21 at 31;
Harrison v Lederman [1978] VR 590 at 593.
24 Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employees Union of New South Wales (1908) 6 CLR
469 at 531; R v Stator (1881) 8 QBD 267 at 272.
25 [1965] VR475.
26 Ibid, at 480.
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appears that none of the circumstances envisaged in the deeming provi-
sions of s. 36(a)-(g) operate to negate consent. Although subss (a) and
(b) of s. 36 mandate that consent is negated where the victim submits
because of force, fear of force or fear of harm of any type which is
directed at the victim or another person, it would require a highly
tortured construction of the word 'submits' in order to bring the victim's
conduct within the meaning of that term. The term submits is not
specifically defined at common law and is defined in the Collins Austra-
lian Compact Dictionary as '[accepting] the will of another person . . .'. As
there is no doubt whatever that V has been raped under s. 38(2)(a)" of
the Act in the example postulated, this serves as a vivid illustration that
s. 36(a)-(g) was intended as a finite and carefully circumscribed list of
deemed circumstances that operate concurrently with and augment the
broader notion of 'free agreement' or the lack thereof in determining
whether the requisite element of lack of consent is present under the
various rape provisions of s. 38 of the Act.
Although the first sentence of s. 36 declares that its provisions apply
for purposes of Subdivisions (8A) to (8D) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic),
Subdivision (8A) includes only the crimes of rape (s. 38) and indecent
assault (s. 39), while Subdivisions (8B) to (8D) include many other
crimes of a sexual nature. For illustrative purposes, however, attention
will focus only on the crime of rape as defined in s. 38 of the Act.
Although rape can be committed in a variety of ways under s. 38, all
methods require the prosecution to prove that the complainant did not
consent to the sexual penetration in question.
In addition, s. 38 generally requires proof that the accused was aware
that the complainant was not or might not have been consenting to the
sexual penetration.^^ While it is true that rape can also be committed
under s. 38 in circumstances where it is proved that the accused gave no
thought to whether the complainant was not or might not have been
consenting,^' it is difficult to envision that many, if any, cases will arise
in which the prosecution will be successful in proving that the accused
gave no thought to whether consent was or might be lacking. Bearing
this in mind, the primary focus of the remainder of this article will be on
the typical scenario in which the prosecution alleges, and is therefore
required to prove, that the accused was aware that the complainant was
not or might not have been consenting. That is not to suggest, however,
that the Morgan principle would apply with any less force when the
27 Section 38(2)(a) provides:
38. Rape
(1) A person must not commit rape.
Penalty: Level 2 imprisonment (25 years maximum).
(2) A person commits rape if—
(a) he or she intentionally sexually penetrates another person without that
person's consent—
(i) While being aware that the person is not consenting or might not be
consenting; or
(ii) While not giving any thought to whether the person is not consenting
or might not be consenting . . .
28 Section 38(2)(a)(i), (2)(b), (3), (4)(b)(i).
29 Section 38(2)(a)(ii), (3), (4)(b)(ii).
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prosecution seeks to convict on the basis that the accused gave no
thought whatever as to whether the complainant was not or might not
have been consenting to the sexual penetration at issue.
Equating ignorance of the law with an honest belief in
consent
In a recent series of decisions in which the Victorian Court of Appeal had
occasion to construe ss 37AAA and 37AA,^ ° the court reaffirmed the
Morgan principle that juries must be directed that they must acquit on
the charge of rape if they find that the accused held a genuine, though
not necessarily reasonable belief, that the complainant was consenting
at the time of the alleged criminal conduct.^' The court then addressed
the relationship between the foregoing sections;^^ s. 37AAA is con-
cerned with various matters relating to consent upon which the jury
must be directed, while s. 37AA relates to the directions that must be
given to juries on the question of whether the accused was aware at the
time of his or her criminal conduct that the complainant was not or
might not have been consenting; that is, the question of whether the
often contentious mens rea element for rape under s. 38 was proved
beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, s. 37AA deals with the factors
that a jury must take into account in deciding this question when an
accused alleges that he or she acted with a genuine belief that the
complainant was consenting to the sexual penetration in question. The
problem confronting the court in these decisions was how, if at all,
the lack of consent and mens rea elements of rape can be reconciled with
the language of s. 37AA(b)(i) that provides:
For the purposes of s 37, if evidence is led or an assertion is made tbat tbe
accused believed that tbe complainant was consenting to the sexual aa,
tbe judge must direct tbe jury tbat in considering whether the prosecution
bas proved beyond reasonable doubt tbat the accused was aware tbat
tbe complainant was not consenting or might not bave been consenting,
the jury must consider—
(b) whether tbat beUef was reasonable in all tbe relevant circumstances
having regard to—
(i) in tbe case of a proceeding in which tbe jury finds tbat a
circumstance specified in section 36 exists in relation to tbe
complainant, wbetber tbe accused was aware that tbat circum-
stance existed in relation to tbe complainant...
Simply stated, if a jury finds under s. 37AA(b)(i) that the accused was
aware 'that a circumstance specified in s. 36 existed in relation to the
30 Zilm [2006] VSCA 72 (5 April 2006) at [2]; Worsnop [2010] VSCA 188 (28 July
2010) [35]; Getachew [2011] VSCA 164 (2 June 2011) at [17]-[25]; Roberts [2011]
VSCA 162 (2 June 2011) at [18]; Neal [2011] VSCA 172 (15 June 2011) at
[88]-[90]; Wilson [2011] VSCA 328 (27 October 2011) at [122].
31 Morgan [1976] AC 182 at 208-209.
32 Worsnop [2010] VSCA 188 (28 July 2010) at [30]-[34]; Getachew [2011] VSCA 164
(2 June 2011) at [15], [33]; Roberts [2011] VSCA 162 (2 June 2011) at [27]-[28];
Neal [2011] VSCA 172 (15 June 2011) at [78]-[79]; Wilson [2011] VSCA 328 (27
Oaober2011)at
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complainant', how could it reach any conclusion other than that the ac-
cused was aware that the complainant was not consenting to the sexual
penetration? Given that s. 36 enumerates the circumstances under
which consent is negated, how can an accused be aware that one or
more of those circumstances is operating in relation to the complainant
and, at the same time, hold a bona fide belief that the complainant was
consenting? Thus, s. 37AA(b)(i) is, on its face, a paragon of superfluous
and circular reasoning in stating that juries must be directed that one
factor they must consider in determining whether the accused possessed
the requisite mens rea to convict for the crime of rape is whether the
accused did in fact possess such a mens rea. Moreover, though the
mysterious and circular wording of s. 37AA(b)(i) makes reference to
'whether the accused was aware that that circumstance existed in rela-
tion to the complainant', why should this reasoning apply with any
lesser force in circumstances where the accused is aware that one or
more of the factors set out in s. 36 might exist in relation to the
complainant, a state of mind that is also a sufficient mens rea for rape
under the various provisions of s. 38 of the Act?
Notwithstanding that the Victorian Court of Appeal has reaffirmed
the Morgan principle on numerous occasions,^' it has somehow con-
cluded time and again that an accused can be aware that one or more of
the circumstances set out in s. 36 is operating in relation to the com-
plainant and, at the same time, hold a genuine belief that the complain-
ant was consenting.^'' How can the court's conclusion be justified in view
of the Morgan precept and the degree of clarity with which the lack of
consent and mens rea elements of rape are enunciated under ss 36 and 38
of the Act respectively? In the writer's view, there is only one possible
explanation.
The court is stating, in effect, that contrary to the maxim that ignor-
ance of the law is no excuse,^' an accused can be aware or reckless as to
the fact that one or more of the s. 36 circumstances exists in relation to
the complainant, yet still hold a belief that the complainant was con-
senting. In other words, while the maxim that ignorance of the law is no
excuse^* denotes that the law does not require the prosecution to prove
that the accused intended to violate the law in order to convict, the
Court of Appeal has eschewed this maxim as a means of reconciling the
palpable conflict between the Morgan principle, the lack of consent and
mens rea elements of rape, and the paradoxical language of s. 37AA(b) (i).
Thus, the recent line of authority suggests that unless it can be proved
33 Most recently in the High Court in Getachew 2 [2012] HCA 10 (28 March 2012).
34 Worsnop [2010] VSCA 188 (28 July 2010) at [32]-[35]; Getachew [2011] VSCA 164
(2 June 2011) at [17]-[23]; Roberts [2011] VSCA 162 (2 June 2011) [32]; Neal
[2011] VSCA 172 (15 June 2011) at [78]-[79]; Wilson [2011] VSCA 328 (27
October 2011) at [130]-[132]; Halamboulis v The Queen; DPP v Halamboulis [2011]
VSCA 449 (22 December 2012) at [23] (• Halamboulis').
35 Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 KB 544 at 546; Churchill v Walton [1967 AC 224 at
236-7; Giorgianni v R (1985) 156 CLR 473 at 506; Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR
661 at 667, 676.
36 Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 KB 544 at 546; Churchill v Walton [1967 AC 224 at
236-7; Giorgianni v R (1985) 156 CLR 473 at 506; Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR
661 at 667, 676.
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beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was also aware that the
circumstances enumerated in s. 36 are those in which consent is not
given, he or she is entitled to an acquittal on the charge of rape
irrespective of whether he or she was aware or reckless as to the fact that
one or more of those circumstances existed in relation to the complain-
ant; that is, provided that evidence is led that he or she acted with a bona
fide belief that the complainant was consenting.
Conclusion
The principle enunciated by the House of Lords in Morgan is predicated
upon sound reasoning as evidenced by its adoption and reaffirmation in
a long line of decisions of the Victorian Court of Appeal and courts in
other jurisdictions.^' Having examined the contentious mens rea of the
crime of rape as defined at both common law and under s. 38 of the
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), it is apparent that an irreconcilable confiict exists
between the principle enunciated in Morgan, the lack of consent and
mens rea elements of rape as defined by ss 36 and 38 of the Act
respectively, and s. 37AA(b)(i) of the Act. It is axiomatic that when
statutory ambiguities arise, the judiciary is duty bound to accord legisla-
tion the effect that Parliament intended. In this instance, the writer
believes that the obvious intention of Parliament in enacting ss 37AAA
and 37AA was to give full effect to the Morgan principle, and the
decisions of the Court of Appeal serve to confirm this view.
When confronted with the duty of giving ss 36, 38 and 37AA(b)(i)
their intended effect, and faced with the irreconcilable confiict among
them, the Court of Appeal apparently relied on the rule of interpretation
that presumes legislation is not to be construed as redundant.'* Had the
Court of Appeal conceded that one cannot be aware that one or more of
the circumstances enumerated in s. 36 exists in relation to the complain-
ant and, at the same time, hold a belief that he or she was consenting,
that would have inexorably compelled the court to hold that
s. 37AA(b)(i) is redundant, thereby violating a cardinal tenet of stat-
utory construction. Confronted with this dilemma, the court opted for
an interpretation of these confiicting provisions that, while obviating the
need to declare s. 37AA(b)(i) redundant, violated the maxim that ignor-
ance of the law is no excuse. Under the circumstances, therefore, one
should not be too inclined to fault the court for casting aside this maxim
37 R V Saragozza [1984] VR 187; R v Wozniak and Pendry (1977) 16 SASR 67; R v
McEwan [1979] 2 NSWLR 926.
38 This principle can be traced back through legislative authority to the 17th century;
'in The King v. Berchet [1 Show., 106], a case decided in 1688, it was said to be a
known rule in the interpretation of Statutes that such sense it to be made upon the
whole that no clause, sentence or work shall prove superfluous, void or
insignificant, if by any other construction they may all be made useful or pertinent'
The Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405 at 414; the principle has been
affirmed in Victoria in Shell Company of Australia Ltd v City of Melbourne [1997] 2 VR
615, 643 at [39]-[40] and as recently as August 2010 in Commissioner of State
Revenue v Landrow Properties Pty Ltd [2010] VSCA 197 at [51].
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as an alternative to violating the long-standing rule of interpretation
that legislation should not be construed as superfluous."
Most, but not all of the relevant decisions of the Court of Appeal were
decided in 2010 and 2011.'*° Thus, it is the writer's hope that the
Victorian Parliament will soon take remedial action to eliminate this
conflict and give ss 37AAA and 37AA their intended effect; to wit: to
codify the Morgan principle with added guidance to juries (s. 37AA) in
the form of mandatory directions as to what specific matters they must
consider in determining whether the accused actually held an honest
belief that the complainant was consenting or, to put the matter another
way, whether the prosecution has satisfied its burden of proving the
requisite mens rea for the crime of rape as defined in s. 38 of the Crimes
Act 1958 (Vic).
39 Shell Company of Australia Ltd v City of Melbourne [1997] 2 VR 615, 643 at [39]-[40];
Commissioner of State Revenue v Landrow Properties Pty Ltd [2010] VSCA 197 at [51].
40 Worsnop [2010] VSCA 188 (28 July 2010); Getachew [2011] VSCA 164 (2 June
2011); Roberts [2011] VSCA 162 (2 June 2011); Wifl/[2011] VSCA 172 (15 June
2011); and Wilson [2011] VSCA 328 (27 October 2011); Halamboulis [2011] VSCA
449 (22 December 2011). But see Zilm [2006] VSCA 72.
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